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1 Introduction
In Norway, the indirect tax system is responsible for about one third of total
tax revenue. It consists of two parts. On the one hand, a value added tax
system that up til 2000 imposed a uniform rate of 23% on most commodities
but exempted an important set of services. On the other hand, excise taxes
that are imposed on a range of products. These taxes are based on the
products’ physical properties (% of alcohol content, motor capacity, ...) and
are motivated by environmental considerations (petrol, packaging), merit
good arguments (spirits and tobacco), or property right arguments (tapes).
Excise taxes increase the value of a commodity and therefore the basis for
the value added tax on that commodity.
In the Fall of 2000, a proposal to reform the value added tax system
was passed in the Norwegian Parliament. The general value added tax rate
was to be raised from 23 to 24% from January 2001 onwards, and became
applicable as well to most types of services from July 1, 2001 onwards. Also
from that date, the VAT rate on food and beverage items was reduced to
12%.
Tax reforms have consequences for the eﬃciency with which resources in
the economy are allocated, for the distribution of welfare over households,
and for the environment. ’Large’ changes in the indirect tax system, should
be evaluated by means of a microeconomic general equilibrium model. For
’small’ reforms, however, a limited amount of statistical information suﬃces
to identify directions of reforms that are desirable out of eﬃciency and/or
equity concerns. Such exercises have been performed for a number of devel-
oped and developing countries. Examples are Decoster & Schokkaert (1989,
1990) for Belgium, Madden (1995) for Ireland, Ahmad & Stern (1984) for
India, Ahmad & Stern (1991) for Pakistan, and Kaplanoglou & Newbery
(2003) for Greece.
The above described reform of the Norwegian value added tax system is
not a small one. Except for the rise in the rate non-food rate from 23 to
24 %, the nominal rate on many services was raised from 0 to 24%, while
the rate on food items was halved. In this paper, we are concerned with
an evaluation of the direction of this reform by taking the eﬀective indirect
tax rate structure of 1999 as our starting point and analysing ’small’ or
marginal reforms. Methodologically, our framework extends the one used by
the authors referred above, by explicitly taking environmental considerations
and merit good arguments into account.
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In the next section we present the theoretical tools to evaluate marginal
reforms. In section 3, we first present the empirical basis for our study,
including all the parameter values we use as input for the exercise, some of
which are relegated to an appendix. Thereafter we present results of the tax
analysis, focusing on the ranking of commodities according to the marginal
cost of partial tax increases, and how the ranking changes with the diﬀerent
household deciles and the environment. Furthermore we demonstrate the
possibilities of Pareto improving reforms. In section 4 we introduce a social
welfare function and demonstrate diﬀerent types of social welfare improving
reforms. Concluding remarks are collected in section 5.
2 A theoretical framework
We consider an economy with H households whose preferences can be rep-
resented by the utility functions uh(·) (h = 1, ...,H) defined over n com-
modities (xi, i = 1, ..., n), tradeable on competitive markets. The oﬀ-
producer prices on these markets are given by the price vector p = (p1, ..., pn)0.
Household h has disposable income mh that comes from labour earnings,
replacement incomes, and capital incomes. The government imposes spe-
cific indirect tax rates ti such that the consumer price for commodity i is
qi = pi+ti (i = 1, ..., n). Facing these prices, household h demands xhi (q,mh)
units of commodity. For future reference, we denote h’s normalised price for
good i by πhi
def
= qimh .
Indirect tax revenue
Aggregate demand for commodity i is given by1
xTi (q)
def
=
X
h
xhi (q,m
h),
and indirect tax revenue can therefore be written as
R(t) def=
X
j
tjxTj (p+ t).
A marginal increase in tax rate i results in extra revenue for the treasury
to the amount of
ri
def
=
∂R
∂ti
= xTi +
nX
j=1
tj
∂xTj
∂qi
.
1Hereafter we ignore the vector of income levels (m1, ...,mH) as an argument in com-
modity demands.
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Multiplying this expression through by qi, we obtain
qiri = qixTi +
nX
j=1
t∗jεjiqjx
T
j , (1)
where εji
def
=
∂xTj
∂qi
qi
xTj
is the aggregate cross price elasticity and t∗i
def
= tiqi is the
eﬀective tax rate as a fraction of the consumer price.
The government evaluates indirect tax reforms in terms of its eﬀects on
household welfare and the environment.
Household welfare
Household welfare is not necessarily perceived in the same way by the
government as by the household. The reason for this perception wedge
is that the government may be convinced about the beneficial/detrimental
properties of some commodities, which households disregard when making
their purchasing decisions. The obvious examples here are alcohol and to-
bacco. In the empirical application, these commodities belong to the same
consumption category and we will therefore in the rest of the paper assume
that only one commodity has (de)merit properties, viz commodity n. To
model merit good arguments in the social evaluation, we follow the approach
put forward by one of us (Schroyen, 2005a,b) and take the government’s eval-
uation of household h’s consumption bundle as (we drop for the time being
the household index)
U(x−n, xn)
def
= u(
x
1− μxn
),
where x−n is a shorthand for the truncated bundle (x1, ..., xn−1) . The para-
meter μ measures to which extent good n is considered a merit good. It has
the dimension of a normalised price (a price in proportion to income), so that
μxn can be interpreted as a virtual budget share for commodity n.2 Defining
now the (uncompensated) consumer’s and government’s marginal evaluation
2If πci (x, u) (i = 1, ..., n) are the compensated inverse demand functions for the house-
hold (giving demand prices in proportion to income), the compensated inverse demand
functions for the government can be shown to be
Πci (x, u) = π
c
i (x, u) (i 6= n), and
Πcn(x, u) = π
c
n(x, u) + μ.
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of commodity j, as (subscripts with u and U denote partial derivatives)
πj(x)
def
=
uj(x)P
k uk(x)xk
and Πj(x)
def
=
Uj(x)P
k Uk(x)xk
,
respectively, it can be shown that, to a first approximation,
Πj(x) ' πj(x) [1 + σjwnη] (j 6= n), (2a)
Πn(x) ' πn(x) [1 + η + σnwnη] , (2b)
where σj is the scale elasticity for commodity j (the relative change in the
demand price of commodity j due to a 1% increase in the Divisia quantity
index
P
j wjdlog xj), wn is the budget share of the merit good, and η
def
= μπn ,
a dimensionless measure of the merit good argument. Merit considerations
regarding good n thus have two eﬀects on the government’s demand prices.
First, they boost the government’s demand price for good n (relative to
the household’s demand price) with η. But second, and less obviously,
the government considers the household to be better oﬀ because of all the
inframarginal units of n consumed. This has a scale eﬀect on all demand
prices whose importance depends on the budget share of n.
Reintroducing the household index h, the eﬀect of a marginal change in
ti on this household’s welfare can be shown to be given by
−qi
∂Uh
∂ti
' (qixi)h − ηh · (qnxn)h ·
ÃX
j
whj σ
h
j ε
h
ji + ε
h
ni
!
(all i, h). (3)
After dividing (3) by (1), we obtain the marginal cost of rasing one extra
krone in tax revenue through rate ti on household hs welfare (as perceived
by the government):
MChi
def
=
(qixi)h − ηh · (qnxn)h ·
³P
j w
h
j σhj εhji + εhni
´
(qixi)T +
P
k t
∗
k · εki · (qkxk)T
(all i, h), (4)
where the small round brackets indicate that one only needs information on
expenditures—not on prices and quantities separately—to compute the MChi .
IfMChi > MChj , a small decrease in t∗i , accompanied by a small increase in
t∗j that compensates for the tax revenue loss, leads to a welfare improvement
for household h. The reason is simple: per krone that is lost by marginally
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lowering the tax rate on good i, welfare goes up by more then it goes down
by raising the rate on good j to make up for the tax revenue loss.
Environmental concern
Environmental concern is assumed to be focussed on the emission of green-
house gasses. These gasses are due to the total production, distribution and
consumption of goods and services:
E(xT1 , ..., x
T
n ).
The eﬀect on emissions of a tax rise on commodity i is
∂E
∂ti
=
X
k
∂E
∂xTk
∂xTk
∂qi
.
Again, multiplying through by qi allows for a parameterisation in terms of
elasticities:
qi
∂E
∂ti
=
X
k
ωk · εki, (5)
where ωk
def
= ∂E∂xTk
xTk
E , the elasticity of greenhouse gas production w.r.t the con-
sumption of good k. Dividing (5) by (1), we obtain the (probably negative)
marginal cost of rasing one extra krone in tax revenue through rate ti on
total emissions:
MCEi
def
=
P
k ωk · εki
(qixi)T +
P
j t
∗
j · εji · (qjxj)T
. (6)
Pareto improving tax reforms
Suppose now that MChi > MChj for all h, then the above reform may
be regarded as Pareto improving for the present generation.3 Should in
addition also MCEi > MCEj , then also future generations, through a cleaner
environment, benefit from the reform.
To determine whether a direction of Pareto improving tax reforms exists,
we should in principle solve the problem
max{dti}
P
i ridti
s.t. (i)
P
iMC
h
i ridti ≤ 0 (all h)
(ii)
P
iMC
E
i ridti ≤ 0
⎫
⎬
⎭ (P1)
3 ’Pareto improving’ should here be understood as ’when evaluated by the government’.
It does not necessarily mean that every household would endorse the reform, since its
preferences have been distorted by the government.
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where the dti are ’small’.
Rather than searching for ’small’ dtis, Ahmad & Stern (1984) suggest to
look instead for a set of δi (i = 1, ..., n) where δi is the extra revenue raised
from increasing the tax on good i; these revenue changes are then constrained
to be smaller than one in absolute value. For this purpose, we define δi as
ridti (all i) and checking the existence of a Pareto improving tax reform is
thus equivalent to solving
max{δi}
P
i δi
s.t. (i)
P
iMC
h
i δi ≤ 0 (all h)
(ii)
P
iMC
E
i δi ≤ 0
(iii) −1 ≤ δi ≤ 1 (all i)
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(P2)
If the solution to this problem is δi = 0 (all i), we can apply Farkas-
Minkowski’s lemma and solve the inverse problem, that is search for a set of
H + 1 non-negative welfare judgements (β1, ..., βH , βE), such that
HX
h=1
βhMChi + β
EMCEi = 1 (all i). (7)
This expression says that for an optimal tax vector, the social marginal cost
of increasing every tax rate to raise an extra krone in tax revenue should
equal that krone.
In the empirical part, this problem will not concern us as there is room for
Pareto improvements. Christiansen & Jansen (1978) have solved the ’inverse
problem’ for the Norwegian indirect tax system of 1975. Their approach,
however, is slightly diﬀerent in that they constrain the social welfare parame-
ters βh to be monotonically declining according to the exponential function
βh = β1 · (mhm1 )−e, where e ∈ [0,∞) is an inequality aversion parameter (this
function was introduced by Stern, 1977). Implicitly, they thus assumed that
the 1975 system does not allow for Pareto improvements.
3 Empirical analysis
The theory above is now applied to analyse marginal indirect tax reforms
in the Norwegian economy as of 1999, and use the result to evaluate the
direction of the reform which was passed in Parliament in November 2000.
We start out by presenting the empirical basis of our tax analysis, in terms of
price, income and scale elasticities, tax rates, emission rates, and expenditure
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patterns of ten representative consumers. Next we present the results of our
tax reform analysis, by proceeding in three stages. First we ignore merit good
considerations and the eﬀects on the environment, second we introduce the
merit good argument, and finally we also take environmental externalities
into account. According the MChi expression (4) we need price and scale
elasticities at the individual level. Since we we lack this information, we
replace them with the respective aggregate elasticities.
3.1 Empirical basis
All the empirical parameters needed in our analysis of tax reforms are pre-
sented in table 1 below and in tables A1-A2 in the appendix. These parame-
ters are taken from a comprehensive system of statistics, econometric studies
and simulation models, including both micro and macro data, compiled and
carried out by Statistics Norway.
The budget shares, Engel elasticities and direct Cournot elasticities pre-
sented in Table 1, stem from a complete demand system for a representative
household in Norway 1999, generating macro demands by multiplying with
the number of households. The cross price Cournot elasticities are presented
in table A2 in the appendix. They fulfil all restrictions following from
adding-up, homogeneity, symmetry and negativity. The macro demands can
be generated from a Gorman polar cost function with linear demographics.
Under absence of corner solutions, these macro demands can also be gener-
ated by exact aggregation from a population of households with correspond-
ing demand functions (cf Aasness, Bye and Mysen, 1996, pp. 339-341).4
4An earlier and more simple version of the model is described in Aasness, Bye and
Mysen (1996) and the references therein. The model we used to generate tables 1 and A2
is documented in Nygard and Aasness (2003) and the references therein. Each household
in the population is assumed to have a utility function in terms of a utility tree with
55 commodities and 34 branches, at each branch the preferences can be described by a
translated CES utility function, where the ”necessity quantities” are linear functions of
the number of children and adults in the household. The demand system is calibrated
using data from household expenditure surveys and national accounts. The elasticities
are aggregated to the 14 commodities in this paper using Hicksian aggregation. The
aggregation is partly across branches of the underlying utility tree.
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Table 1. Budget shares, income, own (uncompensated) price and scale
elasticities, eﬀective tax rates and emission shares. Average household.
Norway 1999.
i Commodity group Budgetshare
Income
elasticity
Own price
elasticity
Scale
elasticity
Eﬀective
tax rate
Emission
share
1 Food and non-alcoholic drinks .143 0.31 -0.21 -4.36 .21 .320
2 Alcohol and tobacco .046 0.94 -0.75 -0.44 .69 .020
3 Clothing and footwear .055 1.16 -0.51 -0.15 .19 .020
4 Gross rents .155 1.13 -0.61 -0.19 .02 .018
5 Electricity .028 0.42 -0.26 -3.98 .28 .022
6 Fuels .005 0.18 -0.48 -5.10 .23 .084
7 Health .026 0.74 -0.32 -1.35 .08 .011
8 Private transport .094 1.39 -0.84 0.04 .42 .294
9 Public local transport .017 0.87 -0.66 -0.50 .00 .037
10 Public distant transport .010 1.77 -1.65 0.13 .05 .016
11 Post and telecommunication .022 0.31 -0.28 -2.76 .18 .006
12 Other goods .151 1.03 -0.53 -0.40 .17 .094
13 Other services .181 1.20 -0.62 -0.08 .11 .057
14 Direct purchases abroad .067 1.52 -0.92 -0.12 .00 0
Sum (weighted) 1 1 -1 1
The price elasticities for the representative household in tables 1 and A1
are our estimates of the εji in the formulae of section 2. Since we analyse
marginal tax reforms, the expenditures for the diﬀerent households (qixhi ) in
the year 1999 suﬃce to calculate the eﬀects on the standard of living. In
order to make the analysis transparent, and comparable with similar studies
for European countries, we have constructed ten households to represent the
Norwegian population of households in 1999. The expenditure patterns of
these ten representative households are presented in table A2 in the appendix.
Household expenditures are derived from a microsimulation model which is
calibrated to the same 1999 consumption data as the macro model, so that
the aggregation restrictions presented at the start of section 2 are fulfilled in
our marginal tax analysis.
The fourth column of table 1 gives the scale elasticity for each commodity.
These elasticities were obtained by inverting the direct demand system (see
Schroyen, 2005b, on the algorithm). Their interpretation is the percent
change in the demand price of a commodity for a 1% increase in the Divisia
quantity index (
P
j wjdlog xj).
The fifth column of table 1 lists the eﬀective tax rates for all 14 categories.
These rates are the sum of the value added tax, ad valorem tax and volume
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tax as a fraction of the final consumer price for the year 1999.5
The final column gives the emission shares. Emissions include both direct
emissions from the consumers and emissions from the producers of the con-
sumer goods, including the emissions from the production of the intermediate
goods used in the production of the consumer goods, applying input-output
techniques. The emission estimates are taken from Indahl, Sommervoll and
Aasness (2001, table 1, last column), updated to 1999 and aggregated to the
commodity groups used in this paper.
3.2 Results ignoring merit goods and emission eﬀects
When presenting our results, we proceed in three stages. First we ignore
merit good considerations and the eﬀects on the environment. Next, we
introduce the merit good argument, and finally we also take the negative
environmental externalities into account.
The marginal costs for the ten representative households when setting
ηh = 0 are reported in table A3 of the appendix. But as we discussed
earlier, to identify the eﬀect of reform on household hs well-being, it suﬃces
to compare the ranking of the diﬀerent MChi . The rankings are depicted in
figure 1.
First notice how a marginal tax changes may have very diﬀerent eﬀects
on the well-being of diﬀerent households. While the lower deciles would
approve of a reduction in the tax rate on food or fuel and an increase in that
on private transport or public distant transport, exactly the opposite
is true for the upper deciles. A similar finding was reported by Decoster
& Schokkaert (1989) for Belgium and Kaplanoglou & Newbery (2002) for
Greece. This should not come as a surprise since the budget share for food
falls from more than 25% for the lowest decile down to 9% for the highest
decile (cf table A2). Private and public distant transport, on the other hand
increase from less than 4% (taken together) up to almost 13%. Much less
variation is there in the budget share for public local transport: from 1.9%
for h = 1 to 1.6% for h = 10.
Figure 1 also shows that the type of reform passed in the Norwegian
parliament in the Fall of 2000—a reduction in the VAT rate on food items,
5These are calculated for 1999 by the input-output model integrated in the Norwegian
national accounts and large scale general equilibrium models of Statistics Norway. See
e.g. Holmøy et al (1994, 2.17.1-5)
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Figure 1: Rankings of MChi (η = 0).
and introduction of VAT on services—is benefiting the first seven deciles and
making the last three deciles worse oﬀ.
Except for the first decile, all other deciles would also agree on a reduction
in the tax on private transport (excise taxes on gasoline and on cars) if
this was financed by more expensive public local transport.
Another observation is that all ten representative households would en-
dorse lower excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco no matter how financed
through other commodity taxes (even that on health services!).
Many observers are likely to utter scepticism about these last policy pro-
posals, arguing that the high level of excise taxes on alcoholic beverages and
tobacco serve to contain consumption patterns that put health at risk, and
that excise taxes on private transport play a Pigouvian role. In a next stage,
we therefore introduce the merit good argument and environmental concerns.
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3.3 Introducing a merit good and environmental con-
cerns
We single out the category alcohol and tobacco as a demerit good whose
consumption is depreciated by the government with a factor η < 0 common
for all deciles. An important question is then what value η should take. In
recent years, public opinion is unambiguously converging on the idea that
smoking is detrimental for people’s health.6 Regarding alcohol, the sale of
beverages with an alcohol content of more than 5% is restricted in Norway
to Vinmonopolet, the stated owned wine monopoly.7
As seen earlier, a zero value for η makes it possible to make all deciles
better oﬀ by lowering taxes on alcohol and tobacco, and raising the tax on
health care. From table A3, it transpires thatMChalc&tob−MChhealth is lowest
for households in the lowest decile. It turns out that−.67 is the highest value
for η such that MChalc&tob ≥ MChhealth (all h) (the inequality being binding
for the lowest decile). On the other hand, for any value of η below −.784,
we have that MChbev&tob ≤ MChhealth (all h) so that every decile’s well-being
could be improved by taxing beverages and tobacco heavier and making
health care products and services cheaper. We therefore fix η at −.70 in
the remainder of the paper. This means that the government’s marginal
willingness to pay for alcohol and tobacco lies about 68.6% below that of
the consumer.8 For this parameter value, the ranking of the diﬀerent MChi
are given in the first ten columns of figure 2 (based on table A4).
From this figure, it transpires that the government could still increase the
well-being of every decile by at least two reforms: lowering taxes on private
transport, clothes and footwear, other services and raising them on
public distant transport; and lowering taxes on alcohol and tobacco
and rasing them on gross rents. But are such reforms also to the benefit
of the environment?
That question can be addressed by looking at the last ranking in figure
6Since June 2004, smoking is no longer allowed in Norwegian cafés and restaurants.
7Vinmonopolet was established in 1922 after a general referendum in 1919 where more
than 60% of the electorate voted in favour of a ban on the sale of spirits and liquor. Several
years later, this ban was abolished and Vinmonopolet got the sole right to sell spirits and
liquor.
8Using (2b), we get that
Π2(x)− π2(x)
π2(x)
' (1 + σ2w2) η = [1 + (−.441)(.0464)] (.7) = −.686
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Figure 2: Rankings of MChi and MCEi (η = −.7).
2, indicated as ’Env’. This column depicts the ranking of the marginal
costs for the environment, MCEi . As explained in section 2, the cost for the
environment comes in the form of greenhouse gas emissions related to the
consumption, production and distribution activities of the 14 commodities
(except for purchases abroad).
For each decile h we have computed the rank correlation coeﬃcient be-
tween theMChi andMCEi . These are reported in table 2. For most deciles,
these correlations are insignificant. But it transpires that pleasing deciles
2, 3 or 4 and the environment poses a challenge. Interestingly, the rank
correlation becomes less negative (and even positive) when considering the
upper deciles.
Table 2. Rank correlation coeﬃcient between MChi and MCEi
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
rankcorr(MChi ,MC
E
i ) -.26 -.43 -.46 -.34 -.29 -.28 -.29 -.24 -.08 +.13
The impact of the 2000 reform on the environment can be readily read
oﬀ from the final column in figure 2: MCEfood < MC
E
oth serv indicates that
greenhouse gas emissions will have increased following this reform. The
explanation is that consumption of food items entails production and distri-
bution activities which are heavy contributors to greenhouse gas emission (an
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emission share of 29%). Services, on the other hand, pollute far less (3.6%
emission share). The reduced demand for services due to the introduction
of a VAT, does not compensate for the extra CO2 emissions following the
increased consumption of food items.
Notice also that the relative ranking for private transport/clothing
and footwear/other services relative to public distant transport now
switches: the environment is made worse oﬀ when reducing taxes on one of
the former category and raising them on the latter to neutralise the eﬀect
on revenue. The same can be said about the second reform that was earlier
identified as Pareto improving. Taxing (imputed) gross rents heavier while
cutting on the tax on alcohol and tobacco goes at the cost of more CO2-
pollution. However, this does not mean that Pareto improving reforms
are non-existent. In table 3, we show the solution to problem (P2) (with
η = −.7).
Table 3. A Pareto improving reform securing
maximal revenue (η = −.7).
i Category δi
1 Food & Beverages 1
2 Alcohol & Tobacco −1
3 Clothing & Footwear −.28
4 Gross Rents 1
5 Electricity −1
6 Fuels .22
7 Health 1
8 Private transport −1
9 Public local transport 1
10 Public distant transport 1
11 Post & telecommunication −.31
12 Other goods −1
13 Other services 1
14 Purchases abroada 0
Sum 0.9317
a δ14 was constrained to zero
This reform produces a maximal revenue increase of 0.93 kroner. It keeps
emissions constant and makes all deciles, except for the 1st, 9th and 10th
strictly better oﬀ. This reform is striking in several respects. First, pri-
vate transport features among those commodities that can be taxed more
leniently while public local transport should be taxed heavier. Fuels and
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other services are categories that should be taxed more heavily, but so is
food (unlike what the 2000 reform did). And strikingly, the tax on alco-
hol and tobacco should be reduced, while that on health care should be
raised—and this despite the fact the government already discounts the former
category at a rate of 70% (since η = −.70).
4 Social welfare improving reforms
Above, it was established that there is room for a reform of the Norwegian
indirect tax system that makes every decile better oﬀ and reduces CO2-
emissions. Two qualifications should be kept in mind. First, that ’better
oﬀ’ means as perceived by the government. Second, that we only looked at
the welfare of the representative agent in each decile: all persons in a decile
were treated identically. Should we increase the number of representative
agents, e.g. to 100, then the likelihood of finding a tax reform that furthers
the welfare of every agent would be close to zero. One can then no longer
avoid comparing the losses of some agents with the gains experienced by
others.
There is nothing that prevents us to carry out such a welfare analysis by
calculating and comparing
P10
h=1 β
hMChi (all i). For this purpose, we use
the iso-elastic specification for the social marginal utility of income,
βh = β1 · (m
h
m1
)−e · (n
h
n1
), e ∈ [0,∞),
normalise β1 to 1, where mh is taken as total consumption expenditure per
equivalent adult (i.e. standard of living in table A2) and nh is the average
number of persons in a household of decile h (thus giving one welfare vote to
each person in the underlying population).9 The parameter e is the inequal-
ity aversion parameter with e = 0 reflecting eﬃciency with no distributional
concerns while e→∞ puts zero weight on all but the lowest decile (Rawls).
For practical purposes, this last case can be studied by taking e = 10. We do
not add the environment/future generations in the computation of the MCi
since this would require the selection of a βE. We call
P
h β
hMChi therefore
the short term social marginal cost of category i.
Figure 3 presents the rankings of the short term MCs for seven diﬀerent
values of e. Thus private transport and public local transport change
9The average household size in each of the ten deciles are as follows: 1.70 (lowest
decile), 1.71, 2.22, 2.44, 2.54, 2.40, 2.27, 2.14, 2.01, 2.01 (highest decile).
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Figure 3: Short term social marginal cost rankings for diﬀerent e values.
from resp. a bad and good candidate for a tax increase to a good and bad
one, as inequality aversion grows. Public distant transport should be
made more expensive for any value of e. The marginal cost for food exceeds
that for other services for all values of e. Earlier, it was mentioned that the
first seven deciles benefit from the 2000 reform, while the upper three deciles
loose. Figure 3 (e = 0) thus establishes that the winners’ gain outweighs
the losers’ loss.
We now inquire which δi (i = 1, ..., n) should be chosen in order to min-
imise the
P10
h=1
P14
i=1 β
hMChi δi, without deteriorating public revenue and
without increasing emissions:
min{δi}
P10
h=1 β
hP14
i=1MC
h
i δi
s.t. (i)
P14
i=1MC
E
i δi ≤ 0
(ii)
P14
i=1 δi ≥ 0
(iii) −1 ≤ δi ≤ 1 (all i)
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(P3)
Column a of table 4 gives the results for the eﬃciency criterion. Interestingly,
the recommended policy includes a lowering of the tax on private transport
and an increase in the tax on public local and distant transport and this
benefits the environment (the constraint (i) is slack). Thus, there is no
conflict between a utilitarian perspective and concerns for the environment.
This is no longer the case when we take a maximin perspective. Column b
of table 4 presents the solution to (P3) when the weights to all but the lowest
decile are set to zero and when constraint (i) is ignored. W.r.t. the eﬃciency
15
solution, tax policy recommendations now change for more than half of the
commodity groups. In particular, the tax on fuels is now reduced rather
than increased. Since fuels have an extremely high marginal environmental
cost (cf last column of table A4), the consequence is a deterioration of the
environment. Imposing constraint (i) and re-optimising results in column c
of table 4. The main changes in policy recommendation are a smaller tax
reduction for fuels and a tax increase for public local transport (rather
than a status quo).
Table 4. Optimal δi values (η = −.7, Lagrange multipliers with (i) and
(ii) in brackets).
i Category
a
Eﬃciency
b
Rawls
c
Rawls+env.
1 Food and non-alc. bev. −1 −1 −1
2 Alcohol and tobacco 0 −1 −1
3 Clothing and footwear −1 1 1
4 Gross Rents 1 1 1
5 Electricity −1 −1 −1
6 Fuels 1 −1 −.27
7 Health 1 −1 −1
8 Private transport −1 1 1
9 Public local transport 1 0 1
10 Public distant transport 1 1 1
11 Post and telecommunication −1 −1 −1
12 Other goods −1 1 −.73
13 Other services 1 1 1
14 Purchases abroada 0 0 0
Sum 0 (1.53) 0 (.04) 0 (.03)P
h β
hP
iMC
h
i δi −1.66 −.32 −.26P
iMC
E
i δi −2.61 2.73 0 (−.021)
a δ14 was constrained to zero
5 Conclusion
We have presented a framework to identify and evaluate marginal tax reforms
when merit good arguments and environmental concerns matter. We next
applied the analysis on the Norwegian indirect tax system for 1999. Our
analysis showed that the reform passed in Parliament in November 2000 had
a clear redistributive profile: a lowering of the VAT rate on food items, and
the introduction of VAT on services benefited households in the lowest seven
16
deciles while the upper three deciles got worse oﬀ. But we also argued that
an increase in greenhouse gasses has resulted from the aggregate demand
responses.
We then showed that if the 2000 reform had been complemented with tax
rates rate changes on other products (as specified in table 3), it could have
made every decile better oﬀ. We have also studied social welfare improving
reforms by computing an inequality averse weighted average of the marginal
welfare costs of the ten deciles and arrived at similar conclusions.
It is important to stress the limitations of our analysis. First, we have
been concerned with marginal tax reforms–changes in the indirect tax rates
in a neighbourhood of the existing—1999—indirect tax structure. To evaluate
finite changes in the tax structure, it no longer suﬃces to have ‘local’ infor-
mation about behavioural responses of economic agents in the form of price
elasticities. An explicit system of demand equations for each decile is then
required to trace out the responses.
Second, we have included only ten deciles of household groups, in order
to obtain transparency and comparability to other studies. In reality there
are more than 2 million households in the Norwegian economy, heterogenous
in many dimensions. A full scale microsimulation model might reflect this
heterogeneity in a more appropriate way, and could in principle be used in our
type of analysis. A testable conjecture is that our ten household deciles will
capture an essential part of the heterogeneity, in such a way that our results
on social welfare improving reforms are robust. Another testable conjecture
is that Pareto improving reforms would not exist in such a model with a large
degree of heterogeneity. However, our results on Pareto improving reforms in
our 10 household model would still seem to give some insight in the welfare
eﬀects of marginal tax reform in Norway 1999.
Finally, the empirical basis used and presented in the present paper, may
of course have weaknesses of diﬀerent kinds. Without doubt, improved data
and painstaking econometric work would improve this basis. But since the
main policy conclusions are based on ordinal rather than cardinal compar-
isons of marginal costs, we expect our model to be fairly robust to minor
improvements of the empirical basis.
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Appendix
This appendix presents the econometric estimates of the demand re-
sponses (Table A1), the expenditure patterns for the diﬀerent household
deciles (Table A2), and the computations of the marginal welfare costs (Ta-
bles A3 and A4).
The ten representative households are constructed from a micro simula-
tion model with 26 825 individuals forming 9 964 households with weights
such that this micro population is in many dimensions a good representation
of the Norwegian population in the year 1999 (see Aasness,1997, and Aasness,
Benedictow and Hussein, 2002, and references therein for information on this
model). The households are ranked according to their standard of living, de-
fined as their estimated latent total consumption expenditure in the year
1999 divided by the number of equivalent adults (using the OECD scale),
assuming that each person in the same household has the same standard of
living. The households are grouped in ten deciles such that the weighted
number of households is the same in each decile. The number of persons
per household varies between 1 and 13 in the micro data and between 1.70
and 2.54 among the deciles. This implies that the number of persons diﬀer
between the diﬀerent deciles. The group All in table A2 gives the expen-
ditures of the average household in the micro population, which is equal to
the mean of the expenditures in the deciles. Thus the expenditures in group
All in table A2 multiplied by the total number of households (2 064 574) in
Norway 1999 are the macro expenditures according to the micro model. The
corresponding budget shares are equal to the macro budget shares in table 1
and A1. This is so since we have calibrated both the macro model (behind
table 1 and A1) and the microsimulation model (behind table A2) to fit the
same macro data in 1999. Otherwise the empirical basis for our marginal tax
analysis would not be consistent with the basic theory in section 2.
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